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these proposals. Their details have been debated extensively since February, and there seems little point in rehashing this debate. ' But the president's proposals do raise some deeper philosophical and empirical issues regarding the structure of both income-support programs and categorical grants, and these issues have until now received relatively little discussion. The paper is an attempt to fill that void.
I begin with an analysis of the most central, and interesting, issuewhether responsibility for income-maintenance programs should rest with the states as President Reagan has proposed; with the federal government as many, including previous presidents, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and David Stockman have proposed; or whether income-maintenance should continue as a shared responsibility.2 This normative discussion highlights the critical role played by some key state behavioral response parameters and leads to the development of an empirical model aimed at estimating these parameters. The parameters also permit a simulation of the impacts of the president's "new federalism" proposals on levels of income maintenance throughout the country.
I then address the other side of the question, the impact of categorical grants, block grants, fund cutbacks, and the like on state budgets. I adopt a model used previously in BPEA, but tailor it to analyze the president's new proposals.3
The Federal Role in Income Maintenance
In a democracy it is natural to assume that the level of income support should be determined by the voters. However, the question of whether income-support programs should be determined at the national or state level, or as a shared responsibility, has no easy answer. Since voters are at the same time citizens of the national and a state government, they or their representatives cannot simultaneously set one level of benefits that obtains throughout the nation and another level within a state. Two arguments are usually made for determining benefits at the national level. One is the claim, which can be posed in public choice terms, that voters feel a responsibility for supporting beneficiaries throughout the country at certain minimal living standards. It might be felt, for instance, that especially insofar as children and young families are concerned, a certain level of income support is a basic national right of beneficiaries.4 If particular states choose not to provide such minimum support, there is a psychic externality to voters in other states, hence national actions to constrain state choices are justified.
A second argument for granting the national government priority in the setting of AFDC benefits rests on the possibility for migration. If state legislators perceive that AFDC beneficiaries will immigrate to states with relatively high benefits, and taxpayers will emigrate from states with relatively high taxes, they will keep benefits below the level that would otherwise maximize the collective welfare of a state's existing residents. This tendency exists even if all states have identical preferences about income support.5 The immigration flows cannot be limited by residency requirements, which are now considered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.6
Is it possible to structure a scheme that satisfies this second argument, provides at least some minimum support defined by national preferences, and also allows scope for differences in preferences among states? At least three ways for structuring state and national responsibilities have been put forth. One, advanced by Tresch, is a hierarchical redistribution system.7 Under this plan, the national government would redistribute income among states, the states among localities, and the localities among households. Legislators could vote for as much or as little redistribution as they wanted at each level of government. Migration or the anticipation of it would not distort the pattern of benefits in such a system because a generous locality would be entitled to greater transfers from higher levels of government if low-income families moved into it and high-income taxpayers moved out. If migration were costless, impoverished individuals in localities providing inadequate benefits could move and their doing so would not add to the burden of the locality to which they moved. But if migration were costly, such a system would work little better than a decentralized system in which only states set benefit levels: there would be no way for legislators representing national preferences to ensure that low-income people were taken care of in particular states. Moreover, even if migration were not costly and the system worked as it should, the outcome might not be socially desirable because the scheme could in the long run lead to extreme differences in state and local incomes.
A second possible approach follows similar proposals in education. States could decide on benefit levels, but in the presence of federal "power equalization" grants that neutralize the impact of state income in determining these benefit levels. Hence public assistance beneficiaries in low-income states would, apart from preference (nonincome) differargument given here is usually correct: redistribution should be done at the national level, or national tastes should take priority. See Pauly, "Income Redistribution." 6. In 1969, the Court held that residency requirements are unconstitutional restrictions on free interstate travel and that such laws constitute "invidious discrimination" in distinguishing between poor persons who are long-term residents of a state and those who are not. This decision could be reexamined at any point: some states have recently tried to adopt residency requirements that are yet to be challenged. Thus if the federal authorities set C5 = C2/C3, expected state benefit levels are made independent of state income. The level of C4 determines the average level of benefits. The higher is the income elasticity, c2, the more B is likely to be high in high-income states, and the more this tendency would need to be offset by a generous matching formula for low-income states. Conversely, the greater in absolute value is the price elasticity, C3, the less reason there is for a generous matching rate. But even though an open-ended grant of this sort will reduce or eliminate the income-generated disparity in income-support levels, it will not eliminate the disparity caused by other preference differences among states. The preference for redistribution may vary widely across states, and, if it does, benefit levels will also vary widely, even with power equalization. Voters might want a higher level of income support in a particular state and be unable to bring it about.
A different grant policy variant could potentially have a stronger effect in reducing the statewide variation in benefits. If matching rates depended not on the independent variable, Y, but on the dependent variable, B, the budget line facing states would not be linear but convex (or piecewise linear). The federal government could match a high share of the first XI dollars in AFDC benefits, a lower share of the next X2 dollars, and so forth. The price incentives in such a scheme could be chosen so as to make states cluster around the desired level of benefits, hence reducing the statewide variance in benefits. If the matching rates were in addition made to depend on state income, the virtues of both approaches could be combined.
A third broad approach is the more straightforward one of state supplementation. Under this approach the national government would set a basic guarantee level for the nation. States could then choose to supplement this guarantee or not. To preserve the national priority, it must not be possible for the states to "tax away" the national benefits by reducing their own benefits. But while this scheme does establish the basic guarantee level consistent with national preferences, it does not necessarily result in state supplemental benefits that reflect the desires of voters in states choosing to supplement the national floor. State supplementation levels could still be kept down by fear of migration.
It is also possible to combine the second and third approaches-state supplementation with power equalization. Under this scheme there would be a basic national benefit level that could not be taxed away by states. States would be empowered to supplement this national benefit level to the extent desired. Matching federal grants would make expected state supplementation levels independent of state income by power equalization. The national floor avoids the main criticism of a pure power-equalization scheme with an open-ended grant. The powerequalization grant eliminates income as a source of disparity in supplemental benefits and would reduce the importance of migration fears. And convexities in the grant schedule could reduce disparities even more.
The present system can be likened to this hybrid scheme and has many of its virtues. The basic national benefit level can be thought of as food stamps, a national program available to most low-income families with a basic level of support ($233 a month for a family of four in 1981). In addition to this, all states supplement food stamps with AFDC payments, which are available to low-income families with female heads of household and (in twenty-six states) families with unemployed male heads.9 For most of these ranges AFDC payments are financed by an open-ended federal matching grant with state shares (1 -m) varying between 22 and 50 percent, depending on state income. For very low benefit levels, there is even a convex grant schedule, with the state share being just 17 percent for the first $72 per month for a family of four and a higher amount that depends on state income for the next $56 per month. '0 But although in its general structure the current system can accommodate national and state preferences without the major disadvantages of many other schemes, how it actually works depends on some key behavioral parameters. One factor is that states may appear to supplement food stamps, but in fact respond to food stamp guarantee increases by reducing their AFDC benefits dollar for dollar. If so, the national benefit floor is less effective at the margin than it seems: within some range, it may prove impossible for national legislators to alter nationwide minimum benefits by changing food stamp guarantee levels. Another factor is that the matching grant structure may be less than ideal. The state matching shares may not be well correlated with the Feldstein neutral values given by equation 3 above. If so, expected supplementation levels are not independent of state income. And even if they are, the impact of preferences or other independent variables could still cause such a wide variation in actual supplementation levels that the national priority in setting income-support benefits could not be effec-9. A similar program structure is in place for the aged, blind, and disabled. The basic national floor is called Supplemental Security Income, which now pays $426 a month for a couple with no other income. All states except Texas also provide supplementary benefits, though without the advantage of federal matching shares.
10. This convex schedule was a feature of the original AFDC law, passed as part of the Social Security Act of 1935. Although the convex schedule could greatly reduce the statewide variation in benefits, it has been allowed to wither away by the combined effect of inflation (the kink points have not been indexed and thus have declined enormously in real terms over the years) and the introduction of medicaid in 1965. The medicaid law gave states the option of being reimbursed by their medicaid formula, an open-ended federal grant with state shares depending on income and varying between 22 and 50 percent, as stated in the text. By now, all but two states have switched to the medicaid formula: Arizona, which does not have medicaid (though it soon will), and Texas, where AFDC benefits are actually limited in the state constitution to a level at which the old convex schedule dominates. tively established without a convex grant schedule. A third factor is that the optimality of any set of state supplementation benefits depends on the strength of migration perceptions. If migration of potential beneficiaries is perceived to be highly sensitive to rises in benefit levels, or if states are influenced by benefits in neighboring states for any other reason, these states are thrown off their "closed economy" preferred support levels, and the appearance that state supplementation levels satisfy state choices is again hollow. The remedy for each of these problems would be a more centralized system, with higher national benefit levels and less reliance on state supplementation-exactly the reverse of what the president is now proposing.
A Model of the Determination of AFDC Benefit Levels
The foregoing discussion shows that empirical estimates of critical behavioral response parameters are necessary to evaluate the present income-support system and any proposals for reforming it. There have been previous attempts at explaining AFDC benefit levels, but none focuses on all these key behavioral parameters. In this section, I develop a model of state determination of AFDC benefits that has such a focus.
A first question in building any model of the determination of AFDCsupport levels is why public assistance benefits are paid at all. Essentially four political-economic models have been proposed in the literature: (1) the altruism model of Orr, Pauly, and others,11 in which voters support welfare benefits because they want to raise living standards of the poor, balancing the marginal gain in terms of the utility from higher benefits with the marginal cost in terms of private goods that are sacrificed; (2) the vote-buying model of Peltzman and others,'2 whereby politicians raise AFDC benefits because they are buying votes from their low- income constituents, expanding the program until the marginal political gain among potential beneficiaries equals the marginal political loss among potential taxpayers; (3) the income-security model of Varian,'3 in which voters favor income-support programs not to help others, but to limit the variation in their own income in a world of uncertainty about their income; and (4) the regulation model of Piven and Cloward,'4 in which AFDC is used as a device to maintain civil order by controlling the poor, adding them to the welfare rolls in periods when disorder threatens and removing them from the rolls when its threat subsides.
These models are not mutually exclusive, and there is no reason why AFDC benefits cannot be paid to satisfy a variety of objectives. In many cases the empirical formulation of each model will look quite similar, so that it is difficult for real world tests to discriminate among the models.
But there are a few cases in which the models would imply quite different behavior. One has to do with income in the state. Under the altruism model, as taxpayers become more affluent, they should want to consume more of a range of public and private goods, including incomesupport levels. Under the vote-buying model, the sign of income may well be reversed, as a rise in income could indicate fewer votes to be bought by pandering to those with lower incomes. Under the security model, the same could be true, as fewer voters may fear that drops in income would bring them under AFDC standards. Similarly, according to the regulation model, higher incomes imply fewer poor people and therefore fewer people needing control.
A similar difference could exist with migration incentives. In the altruism model, for a given level of benefits in surrounding states, the higher the cost of raising benefits is, the lower are predicted benefit levels in a particular state. But under the vote-buying model, a rise in benefits could be an attempt to buy voters from outside the state by attracting migrating AFDC beneficiaries, hence raising the net gain to politicians and raising benefit levels. So it goes. Without taking sides on the validity of these models, in this paper I take a general utility-maximization approach that could be consistent with some composite of all theories. The model is similar in spirit to that developed by Orr, but different because it highlights the parameters most relevant to understanding the effects of distributing more responsibility to the states-the parameters describing how state AFDC benefits respond to national food stamp levels (and, in principle, to medicaid support) and to benefits in other states as a result of migration perceptions.
Assume that state legislators are motivated by the utility function, where Ui refers to the quasi-concave utility function of the decisive ith voter in a state, the voter who, through a set of complex political mechanisms, will determine state policy; Xi is the disposable income of the voter; B is the average income-support benefit level in the state; and F is the benefit level in the food stamp program. '5 I assume that food stamp benefits are determined exogenously by the federal government and that a utility weight, a, is applied to those benefits; I assume that the state legislators maximize utility by manipulating B, balancing gains and costs at the margin. A wide range of values for a is possible. If food stamps are perceived by the decisive voter as fully substitutable for money, a should be 1.0. If food stamps are considered in-kind benefits and are viewed as less desirable than cash support, a should be less than 1.0. If the decisive voter prefers to give in-kind assistance rather than cash assistance, a could even be greater than 1.0. And, if the decisive voter takes no account of the other programs in deciding on support levels for AFDC, a should be zero.
The two identities that give the budget constraint in this system are, for the household, ( 
5)
Xi= Y(I -t) 15 . Medicaid benefits can, in principle, be treated symmetrically with food stamp payments in this model, and the reader can consider both in this conceptual discussion. But as I explain below in discussing the empirical implementation of the model, it proved impossible to obtain the data needed to introduce medicaid payments, so I omit them from the analysis.
where Yi is personal income before taxes and t is a proportional tax rate used to pay for AFDC benefits;'6 for states, Taxpayers pay (1 -m) directly, and then must pay 100 z percent of all federal matching expenses. Since the tax rate t finances both the state share and part of the federal share, it includes both state and federal taxes. Note also that only B appears in the budget identity: F is paid for by the federal government and need not be financed by taxpayers in a state.
To this point the maximization exercise is a standard one of maximizing utility subject to these two budget constraints. The complicating feature in the AFDC system is that the recipient population cannot be viewed as exogenous, but instead depends on benefit levels in surrounding states. Defining these benefit levels as B, an equation that expresses how legislators perceive the relation between the number of recipients and relative benefit levels is The least satisfactory approach, though that followed in most other empirical studies of AFDC, is simply to use average statewide benefits per recipient as a measure of B. One disadvantage of this approach is that guarantee levels depend on family size, so observed benefit levels will vary among states and over time if family sizes vary. Another disadvantage is that earned income clearly depends on both guarantee levels and tax rates. As G increases in a state, E will decrease, and observed benefit levels will decrease by varying amounts because the implicit tax rate, sl, varies. This tax rate was supposedly fixed at 67 percent by the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, but because states allow differing amounts of work-related deductions, effective tax rates on earnings have been estimated to range from 2 percent in Missouri to 43 percent in Connecticut.20 Hence observed benefit levels should be correlated rather poorly with some true index of state AFDC policy.
Measuring G by the statewide guarantee level for a family of standard size avoids both of these difficulties. Such a measure obviously is affected neither by variation in actual family size nor by endogenous responses of E to this guarantee. But while G is fully exogenous, it may not be fully informative. On the one hand, states exercise a good deal of administrative discretion over both payment levels and eligibility, discretion that may not be captured in or correlated with G. On the other hand, statewide variation in the implicit tax rates on benefits, s1 and S2, is also relevant, and is not reflected in the G variable.
A sensible solution to this problem, one familiar to budget analysts who compute a full-employment surplus, is to subtract from standardized guarantee levels standardized values of s IE and s2U or be as a variable that is constant for a particular state; it would become perfectly collinear with a state dummy; and because state dummies are necessary to estimate the model with B on the right-hand side, medicaid had to be dropped as an independent variable. Price Correction. The effect of prices was modeled after some experimentation. All money-flow variables in the model are converted to 1981 dollars using the appropriate general price deflator (the overall consumer price index for B, the food index for F, and so on). This deflation puts everything in real terms but raises the possibility that nonindexed AFDC benefits will be temporarily lowered by unanticipated rises in prices. To test for this influence, I tried including the two-year change in prices, with an expected negative sign, to allow for price recognition and adjustment lags. I also tried to eliminate cross-sectional variation in prices by using the twenty-five-city CPI index, again with an expected negative sign, to reflect regional price differences.25
The other variables in the basic models (equation 13 or 16) are the base recipient-population ratio (RIN) and the preference vector, Z. To eliminate simultaneous variation in the former, it would be necessary to use some state average, again making this variable collinear with state dummies and forcing it to be dropped. For Z, as mentioned above, it was necessary to use separate dummies for each state to correct for the simultaneous equations bias that would otherwise result from having B and B on opposite sides of the estimating equation 13. I also included the ratio of recipients that were nonwhite and the state unemployment rate as additional shift variables.
To recapitulate, then, the basic models to be estimated are 13 and 16. In each case an extensive set of preference variables (state dummies, and so forth) is used for the Z vector; the F variable is the result of a twostage least squares estimation; the R variable is a cross-sectional constant; and the B terms are constructed in the complex way described above. Other than these exceptions, the models estimated are exactly as written.
25. That the cross-sectional sign should be negative can be seen as follows. Suppose 13 is expressed in terms of B' and Y', where B' = B (P/P), P is the national price level, and P is some true regional price. Substituting B' and Y' into 13 yields the equation given there with one more term, -[(1 + c3b -c2)I(1 + c3b)] In (P/P). Unless the income elasticity, c2, is greater than 1.0 (which it does not seem to be in the estimates given below), this coefficient should be negative. 26. This comment ignores the income effect; if F declines, the revenue will be returned to states and result in a very small (1 percent) change in their real income. That will raise AFDC benefits slightly through the income term. showed that federal open-ended matching grants can make expected state supplementation levels independent of state income when the income exponent, c5, equals C2/C3. If that ratio is 1.0, the formula for making state supplementation independent of income would become Table 2 compares actual with power-equalizing matching rates for the thirty-three states in the sample under the assumption that C2/C3 equals 1.0. The correspondence between actual matching shares and those necessary to make expected state-supplementation levels independent of state income is still reasonably good. Because the exponent is larger in the formula for actual shares, the variance of matching rates is higher than that in the computed power-equalization shares-Mississippi, for example, has an actual share of 0.233 and a computed power-equalization share of 0.296.
Even though the open-ended grant formula equalizes fiscal power, it comes far from equalizing AFDC benefits across the country. One might then ask why Mississippi, a state with very low benefits, should have a rise in its price? Given the relatively low income-elasticity, Mississippi is here depicted as paying low AFDC benefits mainly because of preferences, and the impact of these preferences is not equalized by the computed federal formula. The present formula succeeds reasonably well in making expected state-supplementation levels independent of income, but that turns out to be a limited achievement. The way to reduce statewide variation in benefits, as stated above, would be to return to the kind of kinked AFDC matching formula that prevailed before states were induced to change to the medicaid formula. deviation of 9 percent. This is a large reduction in and of itself. But when other states are allowed to respond, as in a full dynamic simulation of that equation with all states endogenous, benefits are reduced by an average of nearly 98 percent, with a standard deviation of less than 1 percent. The reason the mean percentage reduction rises so much is the multiplier due to the series of Cournot-Nash interactions. The reason the standard deviation actually declines is that the initial responses are more disparate because the price changes are uneven across states, but when the Cournot-Nash reactions are added, all states are subject to similar demonstration effects.
THE INCOME-SUPPORT SYSTEM
Each of these key parameter estimates illustrates an important characteristic of the current hybrid AFDC-food stamp system. The first two estimates show the system in a reasonably favorable light. Since a appears to be close to zero, it is not only possible for the federal government to impose a floor of F under combined benefits, B + F, but to make marginal changes in this floor without offsetting changes in B (which would obviously not be true if a were 1.0). The same coefficient indicates that combined benefits depend greatly on whether food stamps will remain as a federal program or shifted to state responsibility. As indicated in discussing the empirical results above, the estimate that a equals zero on which these inferences are based is not offered with great confidence. Any inferences about major changes in federal support would be made with more confidence if they could be based on data from periods when food stamps were varying more in real terms.
The estimated income and price elasticities suggest that power equalization-matching shares are not far from the state matching shares now contained in present law, implying that state supplementation levels are approximately independent of state income. But statewide benefits still vary widely. This shows that neutralizing income-induced disparities in benefits accomplishes little in the way of equalizing AFDC benefits across states. Apparently the only way benefits can be significantly equalized within the present grant structure is by reintroducing the kinks in the AFDC formula that were allowed to evaporate with inflation and the introduction of the medicaid formula for AFDC reimbursement.
One parameter estimate points out an unfavorable aspect of the current system. The migration or emulation parameter is so large that state supplementation levels are clearly dependent on those in other states. As long as states set benefits in an uncoordinated manner, these supplementation levels do not reflect the unconstrained preferences of legislators in different states, and thus do not indicate state voter preferences. Moreover, they can lead to a highly unstable response pattern when pervasive exogenous changes are made in federal policy, such as the proposed reduction in federal matching rates. The obvious programmatic remedy for the latter two problems would be to move toward a more nationalized determination of AFDC benefits, with a higher federal floor on benefit levels or with nonlinearities in federal matching shares that would reduce the variance in benefits among states. The original administration proposal, in attempting to decentralize determination of both AFDC benefits and food stamps, appears to move in exactly the wrong direction. But if the administration agrees to a ' "compromise'' in which food stamp guarantees are continued as a national program, and in which a minimum is built into the AFDC program (as eight former Secretaries of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare proposed in September 1982), there would be movement in exactly the right direction.
Should Categorical Grants Be Continued?
The other significant change proposed by the president is to eliminate most of the restrictions on federal categorical grants. This happens in various ways. Last year Congress, acting on the president's initiative, converted fifty-seven categorical grant programs to block-grant form, with much less restrictive spending conditions on state and local governments. This year another forty-one categorical programs are to be consolidated, implying a total switch of $14 billion to block-grant form. In 1984 the president proposes to take all the block grants created under President Nixon, those created in his own administration, general revenue sharing, and still more categorical funds and throw them all into a giant trust fund that in effect forms a block grant for the whole package. Comparing the first and second parts of this paper, both the first part explaining AFDC benefits and the second part explaining public consumption use an underlying utility-maximization framework. In both parts a key question involves displacement of a federal grant. In the first part, that question is whether AFDC benefits will be reduced in response to food stamp increases, and of course the mirror-image question of whether benefits will rise if the Reagan administration succeeds in cutting out food stamps. In the second part the displacement issue involves present categorical grants that support public consumption. Do these grants simply allow states and localities to reduce their own expenditures in an area, or do they add to total spending? Then, if the Reagan administration succeeds in converting these grants to block grant form in which they are largely converted to cash, will spending go down, and by how much?
Beyond this central unity of question and technique, there are also some differences between the two parts of the paper. The first part takes a very detailed look at one fiscal component, AFDC expenditures, and leaves all other types of expenditures (public and private) in a broad catchall group, Xi. The second part contains a less detailed look at its primary focus, public consumption, and disaggregates the X vector into four other categories. Further, since the first part involves mainly price and income elasticities, the implied central spending equation is assumed to be logarithmic. But in the second part the central question involves the block-grant conversion, and because these block-grant terms should work in linear fashion with linear state budget identity constants built into the estimates, the implied central spending equation is assumed to be linear.
Five equations-for public assistance, construction, public consumption purchases, taxes, and the surplus-were estimated simultaneously, with a few trials on the zero restrictions for various independent variables that had insignificant or puzzling coefficients in different equations. The equation for public consumption purchases, the main object of interest here, had sensible coefficients in almost all trials, while some other equations, such as construction, performed poorly.29 To spare the reader a mass of numbers, I present only equations for public consumption purchases. Three variants are given in table 4. The variant in the second row drops some of the independent variables with insignificant or apparently incorrect signs somewhere in the coefficient matrix; and the variant in the bottom row drops almost all insignificant or incorrect signs in the coefficient matrix. It can be seen that the fit of the public consumption equation is always quite good, and the coefficients on the most important variables change relatively little as more and more zero restrictions are made on the coefficient matrix. The best equation for public consumption purchases (as opposed to the whole budget system) is clearly the first-it fits much better than the others, and its coefficients are always more sensible.
The The responses shown in table 5 indicate that switching $14 billion from categorical grants to block grants, as the Reagan administration has proposed to do for the 1983 budget, will lower state-local public consumption purchases by $2.5 billion, a drop of less than 1 percent from levels likely to be in force in that year. Were the entire shift made, about $10 billion will be transferred from block grants to unconstrained grants and another $20 billion from categorical grants to unconstrained 30. These matching shares can be computed from numbers given in OMB, Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1982, p. 255. The overall ratio mentioned there was adjusted to remove the influence of block and unconditional grants (for which there is no matching) and grants to individuals (for which, as was shown above, the federal share is about 0.58).
31. The flypaper term was originally coined by Arthur Okun when he edited the precursor to this part of the paper ten years ago. Reasons for it were debated rather extensively in Peter Mieszkowski and William H. Oakland, eds., Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1979). For what it is worth, the longterm effect of income on public consumption is just about $0.06, virtually the same as the impact effect, while the long-term effect of unconstrained grants is $0.18. But this larger long-run effect should certainly not be attributed to flypaper, which is mainly a short-run phenomenon. grants, lowering state-local public consumption by $8.4 billion, a drop of slightly over 2 percent from levels that would otherwise be in effect at the time. Although there may be significant changes in expenditures for particular programs, the overall reductions are not large, clearly not the stuff of fiscal revolutions. They are small first because for all the rhetorical trumpeting of the growth of categorical grants, these grants are still quite small relative to state-local public consumption expenditures; and second because, as the coefficient estimates suggest, there already appears to be a great deal of displacement for categorical grants. The final numbers in table 5 display the grant coefficients in a different way. The expenditure responses indicate that categorical grants have generally stronger impacts on the state-local public consumption than do block grants, presumably because many of the strings on grants are untied, and that block grants have stronger impacts on public consumption than do unconstrained grants, because not all the strings on block grants are untied. When the Reagan administration made its first proposal for converting categorical grants to block grants, it reduced these grants by 25 percent. Somewhere in OMB there could have been a calculation that states and localities would be willing to pay, or forgo, 25 percent of the grants to have some of the strings untied. The last three columns in table 5 show, for the three estimated equations, how much of categorical grants states should be willing to forgo to have a categorical grant converted to block-grant form, to have a block grant converted to an unconstrained grant, and to have a categorical grant converted to an unconstrained grant. These calculations are done by locating states' 1978 equilibrium points under the grants being compared with the responses shown in table 5, using the price elasticity to measure the change in the slope of the indifference curve over the interval, and using trigonometric identities to determine how far along the income (or blockgrant) consumption line states would have moved on the lower indifference curve intersecting the constrained grant equilibrium point.
The willingness-to-pay calculations show that in the first equation, which performs best, states are already able to divert categorical funds to their own purposes to a sufficient degree that they would be only willing to forgo 1 percent of these grants to have them converted to block-grant form. According to these calculations, the OMB cut in funds of 25 percent was much too large to leave states as well off. Even block grants have some strings, so states should be willing to sacrifice another 1 percent of the block grants to have them converted to completely unconstrained grants such as general revenue sharing. According to the second equation, the response to block grants and categorical grants is identical; states would not be willing to sacrifice at all to have the strings removed, and again, OMB cut grants too much in 1981. But since block grants have a larger spending impact than unconstrained grants, and because the price elasticity is lower in this equation, states would be willing to sacrifice 13 percent of their categorical or block grants to have them converted to unconstrained grants.
Whether one looks at expenditure responses or willingness to pay, the inescapable conclusion is that this component of the new federalism is much ado about nothing. Most of the response estimates indicate that there is already a high degree of displacement for categorical grants, implying that those strings now on these grants to persuade states to spend the grant money are relatively ineffective. Removing these strings will not cause any great social losses, but there will not be large improvements, either. According to the estimates given here, there will be relatively minor changes both in state-local public consumption purchases and utility levels as a result of the president's proposed changes.
Conclusion
This analysis suggests that some parts of Reagan's new federalism program will make an enormous difference on state-local spending levels, and some parts will make little difference. In general, the proposals involving income-support policies will make a great difference. Increasing the marginal cost of AFDC benefits for all states will lower benefits because of the normal price effect, and then lower benefits further to the extent that state responses are a function of the uncoordinated responses of other states. Decentralizing food stamps would also greatly reduce combined benefits for recipients, if it is correct that states decide on AFDC levels independently of food stamp levels and do not replace any federal cutbacks. But one measure that appears to make very little difference, at least on expenditure levels, is the conversion of categorical to block grants. The reason for this is that states already appear to be responding to categorical grants with so much freedom, or spending so much less than the grant provisions require, that an elimination of these strings should not have terribly large effects on either public consumption levels or state utility levels.
Comments and Discussion
Henry J. Aaron: Edward Gramlich has made a valorous attempt to provide convincing estimates of the effects on state welfare spending of President Reagan's proposal to shift responsibility for food stamps and AFDC to the states in exchange for federal assumption of medicaid costs. If, in the end, I find his estimates unpersuasive, it is more because of the recalcitrance of the data with which he is forced to work than with any shortcomings of his methods.
Before turning to his paper, it is useful to look back on the trends in expenditures with which he is concerned. benefits (that is, benefits paid to recipients with no outside income) and to combined food stamp and AFDC benefits. The table shows that AFDC benefits have fallen sharply in real terms, and that even after food stamp benefits are added, the average maximum payment to families eligible for both programs has declined. Under one interpretation, the growth of food stamps has reduced the perceived need for cash assistance and led states to reduce AFDC benefits. Under this interpretation, one need not look at other aspects of welfare expenditures, unless they too affect perceived needs of AFDC recipients or the overall fiscal position of the state. Gramlich has modeled this possibility and allowed the data to determine the extent to which states let food stamps substitute for AFDC payments.
There is So one can view these trends as the rational, utility-maximizing response of states to the advent of a new federal program, from which one can infer the substitutability of food stamps for cash benefits. Or one can view these trends as the disequilibrium response of state governments to changes in prices, incomes, and preferences, in which case nothing can be inferred, I think, about the substitutability of food stamps for cash benefits.
Gramlich has assumed the utility-maximizing approach. His model posits that the sum of an index of welfare benefits and a multiple of food stamp benefits is gradually moved by states toward a desired level that is a function of mean per capita income in the state; the price per dollar of AFDC expenditures, based on the state matching share; the proportion of the state population that received benefits; the level of welfare benefits in surrounding states and in the nation as a whole; and a vector of other variables. It is unfortunate that the data limitations that Gramlich describes prevent him from adequately modeling medicaid payments, which he indicates he would, in principle, include in the utility function and which I suspect may have a lot to do with total state welfare spending. I return to this below.
The variable used to specify the generosity of state welfare payments is a function of the state's guarantee at zero income and the implicit tax rates on earned and unearned income. One could quibble over this measure-for example, it contains no measure of administrative procedures that affect take-up, and it is based on fixed values for each state of the tax variables and of earned and unearned income-but I think that, as a practical matter, it would be rather difficult to make much of an improvement.
The composite variable measuring the subjective value to state officials (or voters-the utility-maximizing unit is not altogether clear) of the sum of AFDC and food stamp benefits depends on the weight assigned to food stamps. Gramlich obtains an estimated weight of zero in the regressions he prefers, but shows that an alternative estimating equation produces an estimate near 1.0. Thus he acknowledges a good deal of uncertainty in his estimates of this key parameter. A simple test of the predictive value of the model, and one that might help pin down this parameter, would be to use it to "backcast"-that is, to predict AFDC benefits for earlier years than are included in the sample. It might be necessary to use some period before the transition to food stamps began.
I believe that there is a more basic problem with this model, however, one that emerges from an examination of the way in which medicaid expenditures enter the analysis. With admirable consistency, Gramlich develops a framework within which some entity maximizes utility by paying AFDC plus food stamps to AFDC recipients, subject to a net income budget constraint. In this spirit, one is interested in knowing how much less such an entity will pay in cash plus food stamps if these same beneficiaries receive a certain amount of medicaid benefits.
As I indicated above, Gramlich does not treat medicaid symmetrically with the other benefit programs because the data are inadequate. Nonetheless, I believe some attempt should have been made to introduce medicaid spending into the estimation. If, as I suspect, the growth of total medicaid costs has been a factor in heightening sensitivity to the burden of welfare broadly defined, one needs to include some variable to take account of its growth. Lacking any more carefully crafted measure, I would include state-financed medicaid expenditures divided by total state population as a reasonable proxy.
In addition, however, if states have a notional subbudget for welfaretype expenditures, one would have to include the effects on state expenditures of federal assumption of the state medicaid share in order to obtain a complete estimate of the effects of the Reagan program on state welfare outlays. Within Gramlich's framework, it would be possible to measure the effect on the state tax rate and, hence, on net income of reducing state expenditures on medicaid to zero.
A related difficulty is the likelihood that preferences have changed regarding public expenditures in general, and welfare or redistributive expenditures in particular. I know of no satisfactory way to deal with this problem. One is tempted to suggest the use of dummy variables for the enactment of tax spending limitation; but this approach suffers from problems too obvious to enumerate. Data in my table 1 document a significant falling off in state welfare-type expenditures. If preferences have changed significantly, a serious shadow falls over the entire approach in this paper.
The results of Gramlich's table 3 raise other questions. The changes in benefit levels, if one impounds the effects of fears of migration, average a little over 50 percent, with suitable diversity among the states; but if the migration perceptions, on which the model is predicated, come into play, benefits will be reduced by almost exactly the same, very high proportion in every state. On the general principle that there must be something wrong with any model that predicts all fifty states will respond to anything in the same absolute amount or in the same proportion, I turn to the final section of the paper. It contains reestimates of a model first presented several years ago. These estimates are used to estimate the effect of President Reagan's proposal first to convert most categorical grants to block grants and then to eliminate them. I have no comments on this section, other than to express my regret that results for public assistance were not presented in addition to those for public consumption. If they had been presented, one could have compared the estimates of the effect on welfare expenditures of the swap of federal assumption of medicaid costs from the first part of the paper with results from this more comprehensive model. The federal assumption of all medicaid costs, in effect, is the reduction of a categorical grant linked to an increase in general revenue sharing. The state assumption of the costs of AFDC and food stamps, in effect, eliminates two categorical grants. But since Gramlich's tables 4 and 5 report results only for public consumption, the reader is prevented from linking up the first and second parts of the paper.
I only wish that I found Gramlich's econometrics more persuasive, as he ends at a position I find most congenial, the judgment that the Reagan initiative will result in sizable reductions in local expenditures, both as a result of incentive effects and because the cuts in spending outweigh the estimated utility gains from increased flexibility. Public debate should focus on this effect of the proposed initiative, rather than on the supposed tidying up of the responsibilities of different levels of government, and Gramlich characteristically directs us to keep our eye on the right ball. Michael C. Lovell: Because it has been only eight months since President Reagan presented his program for the new federalism, the analysis presented in this paper obviously constitutes fast work. Nevertheless, it is a thoroughly researched and skillfully executed study that is certain to be recognized in its own right as an important contribution to knowledge, regardless of the fate of the Reagan proposals.
To my mind, the most provocative result advanced in this paper has to do with the strength of the migration effect on state-determined benefit levels. Legislators apparently fear that their states will be inundated by an influx of recipients, and perhaps an outflow of taxpayers, if their welfare programs are more generous than those of neighboring states. The impact is summarized in table 3. It presents estimates indicating that, if legislators were not concerned about migration, the elimination of federal matching for the aid for dependent children (AFDC) program would result in benefit cutbacks averaging 56 percent; but because legislators fear migration, as Gramlich's estimates say they do, AFDC benefits will be almost eliminated. This is a strong conclusion about the consequences of a downward spiral of benefits analogous to oligopolistic price wars. Although I am not convinced by these estimates for reasons I explain below, I want to emphasize that I am impressed by Gramlich's demonstration that this conclusion is compatible with the available data.
It may be worth noting that Gramlich's conclusion does not rely on an analysis of political machinations, such as the back-scratching activities and pressures of agricultural interest groups that have influenced the federal food stamp program. And Gramlich does not rely on an attempt to model the forces of single-issue voters on legislators, the incidence of log-rolling activities in state capitals, and so forth. Nor does the analysis rest on an attempt to measure directly the extent to which people actually migrate from one jurisdiction to the next in a quest for higher welfare benefits. Further, the perceptions of politicians are not measured through the use of survey techniques, which is just as well; I suspect that many legislators answering a poll would be inclined to emphasize migration in attempting to rationalize niggardly support for welfare programs, whatever the true reason for their position.
In deciding whether Gramlich's conclusion should be accepted, one must consider the structure of the model of the political process that he uses and the appropriateness of the variables he incorporates in its empirical implementation. Gramlich presents evidence on the variations in levels of state aid that result from differences among states in federal matching rates for the AFDC program, variations in state income, case load, and so forth. He proceeds by assuming that the legislative outcome is determined by a "decisive voter" maximizing his (or her) utility function. The decisive voter plays a role as central to Gramlich's analysis as the "representative firm" did to the analysis of Alfred Marshall. Perhaps the "decisive voter" is Harold Hotelling's "median voter"; perhaps not.
I believe that Gramlich's estimates may be biased by the omission of a critical variable. My candidate variable comes from considering the determinants of the tax price paid by the decisive voter. If we were to work through the analysis carefully, I suspect the tax price will be found to depend critically on the ratio of the decisive voter's income to average income. If in fact the decisive voter is Hotelling's median voter, it is the ratio of median to mean income that is critical. This skewness variable has worked in my own research on variations among school districts in education expenditures; I think a measure of skewness of each state's income distribution might be even more important in explaining differences in welfare expenditures.
It may also be important in evaluating state versus federal financing to note that state expenditures, in addition to direct matching from Uncle Sam, are indirectly matched in the case of voters who itemize their deductions. Consider voters living in an average state who find themselves in the 35 percent tax bracket. An increase of $1 in per capita spending at the federal level will impose a $1 incremental tax burden (ignoring progressivity). Although a $1 increase in expenditures in these voters' home state will also result in a gross increase of state taxes of $1, 35 cents of the dollar will be offset by a reduction in the federal income tax due to the deductibility of state and local taxes. The tax price paid by voters who itemize therefore may be only 65 cents of taxes per marginal dollar of state expenditure. While Uncle Sam may have to raise taxes to offset this loss of 35 cents, this is almost negligible at the margin for voters who itemize because it is spread out among taxpayers throughout the fifty states. While it is true that only about 30 percent of federal taxpayers itemize, which means that the "median taxpayer" takes the standard deduction, it is at least conceivable that state legislators, given their own tax brackets, may be more attuned to the interests of itemizing taxpayers. Thus it seems to me at least conceivable that a relinquishment of traditional federal responsibilities to the states might raise total government spending, other things remaining equal.
Although I have not been fully convinced by Gramlich's estimates of the effect of migration perception on legislators, it is worth thinking a bit more about its possible consequences. First of all, I would not be surprised if an evaluation of the utility function underlying Gramlich's analysis revealed that the fall in average AFDC benefits caused a marked reduction in the utility levels of the decisive voter in every state. If this is so, it is not necessarily an argument for federal financing, for it would be possible for states to collude with their neighbors to establish appropriate benefit levels in order to avoid the migration threat. In contrast to oligopolistic firms, states are free to collude without the fear of antitrust prosecution. And such collusion would be mutually beneficial, not just to the colluding state legislatures and administrators, but to each state's "decisive voter" as well. Finally, I must mention that in evaluating the redistributional implications of the Reagan administration's new federalism, it is important to consider more than the impact of the proposed shift of responsibilities on the level of benefits paid in the various states, as in table 3. It is also necessary to consider the redistribution of the financial burden. For example, a wealthy state paying more taxes per capita to the federal government and receiving less in federal support than poorer states would find the self-financing of AFDC relatively easy. To illustrate, Connecticut had about 8 percent of its school-age children living below the poverty level in 1975 while Mississippi had 32.3 percent. The federal personal tax burden for Connecticut residents averages about two and one-half times the tax burden for residents of Mississippi. Shifting the financing of the AFDC program to the states will impose a heavy tax burden on precisely those states that do not have an adequate tax base to shoulder the burden. Not just the poor, but also the poorer states have much more to lose than the rich from the Reagan proposals. It would be useful in evaluating the likely political future of the new federalism proposals to know which states will gain and which will lose.
General Discussion
George Perry disagreed with Michael Lovell's emphasis on the deductibility of federal taxes. He reasoned that deductibility did not change Gramlich's formulation in an important way because it would be present both before and after the AFDC program was turned back to the states. If the median voter deducted his share of the state's welfare expenditures before the reform, he would deduct his share of the state's presumably higher welfare expenditures after the reform as well. Lovell responded that Perry is assuming that voters at the state level were taking responsibility for these programs, at least at the margin, before the change in federal financing. If voters in fact view these programs as a new responsibility as a result of the change in financing, then Perry's argument would not be relevant. Joseph Pechman stressed a point that Lovell had passed over lightly: the deductibility of state and local taxes is irrelevant for the median voter because the great majority of federal taxpayers do not itemize deductions. Roger Gordon pointed out that the voter's conception of tax cost might be complicated in a different way. A large share of state and local revenues are raised by taxes on commercial and industrial property. The median voter may not regard himself as paying this portion of the tax. To the extent that different states have differing amounts of this type of property to tax, the median voters across different states may face substantially different tax prices of raising AFDC benefit levels.
Alan Blinder wondered about the implications of Gramlich's results for other dimensions of state behavior. Given the large amount of cyclical variability in economic conditions over the period under study, he suggested that states facing bad economic times might have tried to force poor people off welfare rolls. Gramlich responded that the coefficients on state per capita income and unemployment rates did show such effects in state behavior.
Michael Wachter observed that the most common response of state and local officials to reduced federal funding is not reductions in benefits but greater stringency in applying eligibility criteria. This impact is terribly difficult to detect using the econometric techniques in Gramlich' s paper. He also expressed the belief that conservative political shifts have been occurring at the state and local levels of government. These too would be hard to detect econometrically and might, for recent years, be confused in econometric work with effects of reduced income growth or reduced federal support.
